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The Place of Space 
in Social and Cultural Theory 
 
Simon Susen 
 
 
 
Introduction 
‘Space’ has become an increasingly important concept in contemporary social and cultural 
theory (see, for example: Bourdieu 1991; Gregory and Urry 1985; Hess 1988; Hubbard, Kitchin 
and Valentine 2004; Keith and Pile 1993b; Knowles and Sweetman 2004b; Massey 1994, 
2005; Pile 1996; Pile and Thrift 1995a; Shields 1991, 1999; Soja 1989; Thrift 1996; Urry 1985, 
1995; Zieleniec 2007). The diversity of empirical and theoretical studies of space is 
symptomatic of the multi-layered constitution that characterizes the physical structuration of 
social life. In light of this complexity, any attempt to provide a comprehensive account of space 
will be fraught with difficulties. In fact, the possibility of a general theory of space appears to 
be contradicted by the abundance of interactional spheres that exist in differentiated social 
settings. Given the variety of both spatial theories and spatial realities, it may be impossible to 
develop an explanatory framework capable of capturing the multifaceted dimensions 
underlying the territorial organization of human societies. 
One of the most insightful accounts concerned with the fact  that  the  construction  of 
society is inextricably linked to the production of space can be found in the writings of the 
French philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre, notably in his influential study The 
Production of Space (1991 [1974]; see also Lefebvre 1974, 1996, 2000, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). 
Lefebvre’s theory of space has been thoroughly discussed in the literature (see, for example: 
Brenner  2000: 367–76;   Butler  2012;   Elden  2004;  Goonewardena  et  al.  2008;  Hess 1988; 
Keith  and  Pile  1993a:  24–6, 30,  36;   Martins 1982;   Merrifield  2006;  Shields  1999,  2004: 
211–12; Soja 1989; Stanek 2011; Urry 1995; Zieleniec 2007: 60–97), but no attempt has been 
undertaken to propose a Lefebvrian outline of a general theory of social space, that is, a 
conceptual framework capable of capturing the transcendental conditions underlying  the 
spatial structuration of any society, regardless of its historical specificity. To be sure, such a 
framework is not meant to suggest that the construction of space can be understood 
independently of its social conditions of production; rather, it is aimed at shedding light on    
the fundamental properties that all social spaces share, irrespective of their context-specific 
idiosyncrasies. In this chapter, no attempt shall be made to do justice to the wide-ranging scope 
of Lefebvre’s oeuvre; instead, the following analysis focuses on key insights gleaned from his 
acclaimed book The Production of Space. These insights, as shall be demonstrated in 
subsequent sections, permit us to develop a tentative outline of a general theory of  social 
space. 
  
 
 
 
Historical and intellectual development 
 
The concept of space in classical sociology 
Before examining Lefebvre’s theoretical framework, it seems sensible to locate the concept of 
space in the canon of sociological discourse. In this context, two straightforward observations 
should be taken into account. 
First, the concept of space can be considered a marginal category in classical sociology. ‘Space 
has never been central to sociological thought’, and therefore ‘it remains fair to say that the 
significance of space for the discipline at large has been peripheral from the beginning’ 
(Lechner 1991:  195). Interestingly, when examining the key works of the ‘founding fathers’   
of sociology – that is, the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Weber – it becomes evident that 
they did not treat ‘space’ as an important category of social analysis or attach paradigmatic 
status to the study of the spatial constitution of society. 
Second, space can nevertheless be conceived of as a central component of social life. Every 
human action is spatially situated, for individuals as well as ‘groups and institutions have a 
“place”’ (Lechner 1991: 195). This may appear to be a truism, but, at least in sociology, the 
seemingly most obvious requires critical reflection. Just as it is vital to recognize that ‘time’ is a 
fundamental constituent of social life, because individuals and societies are embedded in  
temporally contingent contexts, it is imperative to acknowledge that ‘space’ is an integral 
element of human existence, because individual and collective actors are situated in spatially 
organized realms of experience. Of course, it may be far from clear what exactly we mean by 
‘space’ and how it influences, or in some cases even determines, our relation to the world; it is 
difficult to deny, however, that it does have a significant impact upon our daily engagement 
with reality in general and with society in particular. 
Georg Simmel, who is now widely regarded as one of the founding figures of sociology, is 
an exception in the canon of early modern social thought: ‘Among the classical sociologists, 
only Georg Simmel treated space systematically, but his main contribution was largely  
ignored’ (Lechner 1991: 195). Given the originality of his writings, it is worth considering a 
number of significant insights provided by his sociology of space (see especially Simmel 1997 
[1903]; see also Lechner 1991). In essence, we can identify five central presuppositions under- 
lying Simmel’s critical study of the spatial organization of human activities. 
First, social spaces are unavoidably shaped by the power-laden relationship between inclu- 
sivity and exclusivity (Simmel 1997: 138–41). The emergence of social configurations is contin- 
gent upon their capacity to generate realms of interaction defined by – implicitly or explicitly 
recognized – rules of inclusion and exclusion. Regardless of whether we are dealing with 
micro-sociological spaces, which are anchored in people’s lifeworlds and their experience of 
Gemeinschaft (at the local level), or with macro-sociological spaces, which come into existence 
through people’s real, and at the same time imaginary, construction of Gesellschaft (at the 
regional, national, continental or global level), spaces composed of human actors are perme- 
ated by social dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. As critical sociologists, we need to examine 
on what grounds human actors are either granted or denied access to a given social space. 
Whether particular actors are included in or excluded from specific social realms depends 
largely on their position in relation to other actors. Access to social positions hinges on access 
to material and symbolic resources, which are asymmetrically distributed and interactionally 
mobilized through stratifying variables, such as class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability. To the 
extent that social spaces constitute relationally constructed realms sustained by asymmetrical 
differentiations, the existence of territorial separations can contribute to, or even be the basis of, 
processes of demographical segregation. 
  
 
 
 
Second, social spaces are constructible only in terms of the contingent relationship between 
unifiability and separability (Simmel 1997: 141–46). Human societies cannot exist without the 
partitioning of space. Boundaries contribute to both the integration and the disintegration of 
territorial realms. By definition, social spaces are relationally constructed unities which can   be 
joined with, or separated from, one another. The malleable nature of social space is due to the 
fact that human life forms are in a constant state of flux: to the extent that social spaces   can be 
united and divided, codified geographical arrangements can, at least in principle,  always be 
reconstructed. As territorial realities that are at the same time unifying and separating, social 
spaces are sources of both facticity and validity: as sources of facticity, they exist as objective 
realities determining what is possible within a given territory; as sources of validity, they exist 
as normative realities determining what ought to be possible within a given territory. In brief, 
boundaries of spatial organization are both objective and normative sources of social 
demarcation. 
Third, social spaces are marked by the relationship between fixity and changeability (Simmel 
1997: 146–51). Social spaces have the power to constrain and alter human actions, just as 
human actions have the capacity to shape and transform social spaces. When experienced by 
social actors, spatial arrangements may seem natural and given: our constant immersion in  
spatially differentiated realities can make us blind to the fact that social arrangements are never 
forever. Situated in the world as embodied entities, we are prone to take space for granted, 
thereby forgetting that the physical organization of human life forms is socially regulated. To 
the extent that spaces appear to be fixed and invariable, we tend to reproduce them and thereby 
strengthen the power of their legitimacy. Since the territorial organization    of the social world 
is historically variable, however, we can also transform spaces and thereby undermine their, 
seemingly unassailable, authority. The legitimacy of human actions  is  always imposed or 
negotiated in relation to the social spaces in which they take place. What may be considered a 
legitimate form of behaviour in one situation may be regarded as an illegitimate mode of 
conduct in another context. The grammaticality of social space can be either confirmed or 
challenged by the performativity of human action. 
Fourth, social spaces are generated through the relationship between proximity and distance 
(Simmel 1997: 151–59). There is no society without lifeworlds. Only insofar as we are capable 
of experiencing one another in social spaces of physical proximity are we able to immerse 
ourselves in the coexistential realm of humanity. The most deterritorialized societies, char- 
acterized by the creation of abstract space, cannot dispense with embodied actors, situated in 
concrete space. Even when we mediate our social interactions through the use of communi- 
cation technologies, which enable us to transcend space when engaging with others in distant 
localities, we cannot annihilate our deep-rooted need for the experience of face-to-face rela- 
tions, which permit us to absorb space when encountering others in intersubjectively consti- 
tuted realities. The human need for physical proximity can be challenged but not eliminated by 
the power of social technology. For the creation of society is inconceivable without the 
formation of community: the abstract space of Gesellschaft emanates from the concrete space 
of Gemeinschaft. 
Fifth, social spaces are produced through the relationship between sedentariness and mobility 
(Simmel 1997: 160–70). High mobility – for example, of nomadic groups – tends to be asso- 
ciated with low degrees of social differentiation. By contrast, low mobility – for instance, of 
sedentary groups – tends to be accompanied by high degrees of social differentiation. As a 
consequence, communal forms of mobility often involve the creation of social solidarity: the 
more we are bound to share the process of ‘being on the move’ with others, the more likely    
we are to convert the collective experience of mobility  into  an existential source of solidarity. 
  
 
 
 
Hence, it is not only the belief  in primordial ties  based  on  spatial  sedentariness but  also 
joint experience of movement that can bind people together. Both sedentary and mobile 
engagements with reality are fundamental to the construction of modern society. 
 
Lefebvre’s contributions: outline of a general theory of social space 
Five significant insights gained from Simmel’s sociology of space having been considered, the 
question that remains is what contemporary theories of space have added to the picture. 
Drawing on the work of Henri Lefebvre, the following sections aim to provide an outline of     
a general theory of social space, that is, a conceptual framework capable of capturing the 
transcendental conditions underlying the spatial structuration of any society, regardless of its 
historical specificity. As the title of his influential study The Production of Space (1991 [1974]) 
suggests, Lefebvre is concerned with the fact that, far from constituting a sheer given  of human 
life, social spaces need to be produced by individual and collective actors in order to assert 
their existence. Although heavily influenced by Marx, Lefebvre seeks to go beyond a merely 
economic conception of production. To this end, he distinguishes three types of production. 
First, there is a broad meaning of production in the sense of social production. Lefebvre 
characterizes production in the wide sense as follows: 
 
[H]umans as social beings are said to produce their own life, their own consciousness, 
their own world. There is nothing, in history or in society, which does not have to be 
achieved and produced. ‘Nature’ itself . . . has been modified and therefore in a sense 
produced. Human beings have produced juridical, political, religious, artistic and philo- 
sophical forms. Thus production in the broad sense of the term embraces a multiplicity of works 
and a great diversity of forms. 
(1991: 68, emphasis added) 
 
As humans, we distinguish ourselves from animals in that we have brought about the material 
and symbolic conditions of our own existence. To be exact, both the  economic  and  the 
cultural foundations of human life have enabled us to create a social world beyond our natural 
environment. To recognize that we are productive  entities  requires  acknowledging  that  we 
are a socio-constructive species (see Susen 2007: 287–92, 2011: 174–75). The broad meaning  
of production lies at the heart of the constructivist view of reality, according to which both    the 
material and the symbolic dimensions of the human world are constitutive elements of a 
socially organized universe. From this perspective, social production, in the large sense, 
designates any form of activity that contributes to the construction of human existence. 
Second,  there  is  a  narrow  meaning  of  production  in  the  sense  of  economic  production. 
Lefebvre makes the following critical remark on economistic accounts of production: 
 
Neither Marx nor Engels leaves the concept of production in an indeterminate state. . . . 
They narrow it down, but with the result that works in the broad sense are no longer part 
of the picture; what they have in mind is things only: products. 
(1991: 68–9, original emphasis) 
 
Lefebvre is critical of this confined – that is, economistic – conception of production. For    
such a restricted notion of production, which focuses on the economic dimensions of social  
life, fails  to do justice to the species-constitutive significance of the non-economic facets of 
  
 
 
 
human reality. The point is not to deny that, as Marx and Engels put it, ‘[t]he production of 
ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity 
and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life’ (2000 [1846]: 180). Rather, the 
point is to recognize that both material and symbolic dimensions of human reality contribute to 
the construction of society. 
Third, there is a neglected meaning of production in the sense of spatial production. It is   
this third form of production that Lefebvre aims to explore in his critical theory of society.    
The study of spatial production goes beyond both the broad notion of social production and the 
narrow conception of economic production; for the former is too general to account for the 
particularity of spatial processes, and the latter is too specific to account for the ubiquity of 
spatial realities. In order to obtain paradigmatic status in sociology, space needs to be regarded 
as a constitutive element of the social world, that is, as a fundamental component whose signifi- 
cance is reflected in the fact that it represents both a condition and an outcome of relations 
between actors. In treating space as a cornerstone of the social world, Lefebvre seeks to demon- 
strate that spatial production and economic production are inextricably linked: ‘social space is 
produced and reproduced in connection with the forces of production (and with the relations    
of production)’ (1991: 77). In other words, the construction of social relations depends, at once, 
on the creation of spatial relations and on the formation of economic relations. Just as compre- 
hensive studies of social production must address the question of space, critical accounts of space 
need to reflect upon the conditions of social production. 
In light of the above, it would be fair to suggest that, paradoxically, Lefebvre stands within 
the tradition of Marxist social thought, whilst seeking to overcome the economic reductionism 
of its orthodox variants. On the one hand, Lefebvre is firmly situated within  the horizon of 
Marxist theory in that he puts forward a productivist conception of reality, regarding society as 
a collective project created by working entities. On the other hand, Lefebvre seeks   to go 
beyond the parameters of orthodox Marxist frameworks in that he makes a case for a spatialist 
conception of reality, portraying society as a coexistential conglomerate composed of 
physically situated entities. Thus, Lefebvre’s approach can be described as a spatio-productivist 
account of society. According to this view, human beings are both spatially productive and 
productively spatial entities: spaces of production hinge on productions of space, and produc- 
tions of space cannot take place without spaces of production. In short, the production of  
society is unthinkable without the production of space. 
Lefebvre identifies three elements necessary for the production of space: (a) spatial practices 
(pratiques spatiales), (b) representations of space (représentations de l’espace), and (c) spaces of 
representation (espaces de représentation) (see Lefebvre 1991: 38–9). These can be defined as 
follows. 
 
Spatial practices refer to physical and material flows of individuals, groups or commodities: 
social circulations, transfers and interactions that occur in and across space. Spatial prac- 
tices, which ‘must have a certain cohesiveness’ (Lefebvre 1991: 38), guarantee social conti- 
nuity and are indispensable for the consolidation of social order. Due to their material 
nature, spatial practices can be termed ‘spaces-in-themselves’. 
 
Representations of space manifest themselves in ‘conceptualized space, the space of scientists, 
planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of 
artist with a scientific bent – all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with 
what is conceived . . . This is the dominant space in any society (or mode of production).’ 
(Lefebvre 1991: 38–9) 
  
 
 
 
Representations of space serve the regulation of space, for ‘those who control how space is 
represented control how it is produced, organised and used’ (Zieleniec 2007: 74). Given their 
discursive nature, representations of space can be characterized as ‘spaces-for-themselves’. 
 
Spaces of representation – sometimes also translated as ‘representational spaces’ (Lefebvre 
1991: 39) – are directly lived and immediately experienced spaces of everyday life. Insofar 
as spaces of representation are shaped by social actors, and imbued with meaning in their 
lifeworlds, they are sources of  human freedom. As relatively autonomous realms, created by 
the ‘inhabitants’ (Lefebvre 1991: 39) of ordinary life, spaces of representation possess an 
emancipatory potential in that they enable social actors to challenge the legitimacy of 
established spatial practices. In light of their simultaneously material and discursive nature, 
spaces of representation can be conceived of as ‘spaces-in-and-for-themselves’. 
 
With Lefebvre’s tripartite conceptual framework in mind, and with the aim of illustrating the 
explanatory power of his spatio-productivist conception of society, it shall be the task of the 
following analysis to propose a tentative outline of a general theory of social space. 
 
1.       The humanity of social space 
Social spaces are human spaces. For the emergence of social realms is contingent upon the 
existence of subjective, and often intersubjective, practices. Just as human beings are situated in 
a physically organized and symbolically mediated universe, social spaces are shaped by both 
the objective constraints imposed by the natural environment and the normative  arrange- 
ments established in the cultural world. Aware of this existential ambiguity, Lefebvre asks the 
following, rather fundamental, questions: ‘Is that space natural or cultural? Is it immediate or 
mediated . . .? Is it a given or is it artificial?’ (1991: 83). Lefebvre is right to assert that ‘[t]he 
answer to such questions must be: “Both” ’ (1991: 83–4). For social spaces, which are objec- 
tively situated in a physical world and normatively  regulated by  meaning-creating actors,  
exist ‘between “nature” and “culture” ’ (1991: 84). Put differently, every social space is a 
product both of what is physically constituted, and hence objectively present, in a realm of 
facticity, and of what is culturally constructed, and thus normatively relevant, in a sphere of 
validity. In short, social spaces are human spaces whose existence is contingent upon the 
practices performed by those who inhabit them. 
 
2.       The sociality of social space 
What manifests itself in the sociality of social space is an obvious, yet crucial, insight: human 
spaces are socially constituted realms. Critical sociologies of space need to confront the challenge 
of ‘uncovering the social relationships (including class relationships) that are latent in spaces’ 
(Lefebvre 1991: 90). In the human world, spatial relations are never only physical arrangements 
but always also social constellations: a ‘mutual interference occurs here between natural peculi- 
arities of space and the peculiar nature of a given human group’ (1991: 110). To recognize that 
human spaces are socially created means to account for the fact that they are composed of inter- 
related, rather than isolated, subjects and objects. It is the relations between, rather than the 
properties of, subjects and objects which are important to the constitution of social space: ‘space 
is neither a “subject” nor an “object” but rather a social reality – that is to say, a set of relations and 
forms’ (1991: 116, emphasis added). The historical determinacy of a given social space cannot be 
dissociated from the relationally constituted setting in which, and through which, it emerges. 
  
 
 
 
3.       The constructability of social space 
Social space is never simply a given, because it is always constructed by those who bring it into 
existence: ‘For this is a place that has been laboured on’ (Lefebvre 1991: 76, original emphasis). 
Human beings constantly act and work upon the world, forming and transforming it according 
to their needs. Yet, a world that can be constructed can also be deconstructed and recon- 
structed. Social actors are continuously in the process of reconstructing the spaces and places 
they inhabit. Rejecting a narrowly economistic sense of production, we are able to recognize 
that social spaces owe their existence to the daily performances of a socio-constructive species. 
The power of social construction can convert a given space into a place. In fact, the latter is   
the outcome of the former: a place is a socially generated and culturally signified form of 
space. Put differently, a place is a space modified by labour and imbued with meaning by 
culture. (On the distinction between ‘space’ and ‘place’, see, for example: Massey 2005: 68, 
183–84; Merrifield 1993; Zieleniec 2007: 71, 73.) We are both a productive species of working 
creatures and a cultural species of meaning-giving beings: as purposive, cooperative and 
creative actors, we work upon the world; as assertive, normative and expressive entities, we 
attribute meaning to our existence. Social space is permeated by  the  species-constitutive 
forces of production and interpretation, which ensure that there is  always  a  still-to-be  to 
social space: a still-to-be-developed, a still-to-be-transformed  and  a  still-to-be-signified.  The 
very possibility of spatial production rests upon the performative resources of social action. 
 
4.       The economy of social space 
Economic production and spatial production are intimately interrelated, because there is no 
division of labour without a distribution of space. In Lefebvre’s words, 
 
social space is produced and reproduced in connection with the forces of production (and 
with the relations of production). And these forces, as they develop, are not taking over     
a pre-existing, empty or neutral space, or a space determined solely by  geography, 
climate, anthropology, or some other comparable consideration. 
(1991: 77) 
 
On the contrary, the productive forces, as they unfold, take on the shape of a normative space, 
of a space which is determined by, and at the same time determines, the organization of the 
division of labour. Spatial relations are unavoidably influenced by economic relations, and   
vice versa. Lefebvre eloquently captures the ineluctable interdependence of spatial and 
economic relations in the following passage: 
 
Is space a social relationship? Certainly – but one which is inherent to property relation- 
ships (especially the ownership of the earth, of land) and also closely bound up with the 
forces of production (which impose a form on that earth or land); here we see the polyva- 
lence of social space, its ‘reality’ at once formal and material. Though a product to be used, 
to be consumed, it is also a means of production; networks of exchange and flows of raw 
materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it. Thus this means of produc- 
tion, produced as such, cannot be separated either from the productive forces, including 
technology and knowledge, or from the social division of labour which shapes it. 
(1991: 85, original emphasis) 
  
 
 
 
Social space, then, is not only inextricably linked to the forces of production, but it is a 
requirement for their existence. For the spatial structuration of reality is a precondition for the 
economic organization of society. The steering power of every economy depends on its 
capacity to control the spatial constitution of society. 
 
5.       The ideology of social space 
The ideology of social space is reflected in the representations of space which predominate in   
a given society. Representations of space are the imagined realms of those groups of people 
who have the power to monitor and control  the  territorial organization of  society.  Every 
social order is a spatial order. The spatial order sustaining a given social order can be main- 
tained by virtue of an ideological apparatus capable of giving legitimacy to the physical 
configuration of reality. In this sense, the regulation of space ‘cannot be separated . . . from   
the state and the superstructures of society’ (Lefebvre 1991: 85). The recognition of the 
ideological character of social space obliges us to rethink the Marxian model of base and 
superstructure in terms of a spatialist analysis of society. According to Marx, the base consists 
of economic relations, which constitute the material foundation of society, whereas the 
superstructure is composed of an ideological apparatus, which serves to legitimize the rela- 
tions of production underlying a given historical formation. According to Lefebvre, neither   the 
material infrastructure nor the ideological superstructure of society can be divorced from the 
spatial constitution of reality. Indeed, space itself is both a physical and a symbolic element of 
society, that is, it is both a foundational and an epiphenomenal force of human reality. As a 
foundational force, the organization of space is a precondition for the consolidation  of society; 
as an epiphenomenal force, the signification of space is necessary for the creation of a 
collective imaginary. The distribution of space is never neutral but always value-laden, since 
the territorial organization of society is impregnated with the symbolic power of ideology. 
There are no political regimes that are not also spatial regimes, because the control  over 
societal configurations requires at least a minimal degree of power over their territorial 
organization. The exercise of regulatory social authority is inconceivable without recourse to    
a legitimizing spatial ideology. 
 
6.       The relationality of social space 
The various forms in which human actors relate to one another cannot be abstracted from the 
spatial organization of the society to which they belong. Just as social spaces can determine 
relations established between people, people can determine relations established between 
spaces. Every social space designates an interactional arena of possibilities which impacts upon 
the relations between actors, whilst every group of actors represents a conglomerate of 
possibilities which shapes the relations between spaces. Social spaces never exist simply in  
themselves; on the contrary, they exist through the relations established between physically 
embedded subjects. To the extent that ‘a space is not a thing but rather a set of relations between 
things (objects and products)’, and that ‘any space implies, contains and dissimulates social 
relationships’ (Lefebvre 1991: 83, 82–3, emphasis added), the creation of spatial relations is 
contingent upon the construction of social relations. Social spaces are composed of subjects  
and objects, both of which are imbued with the power of social agency. Agency is not only a 
privilege of subjects, but also a potential attribute of objects, since both subjects and objects 
have the power to determine the ways in which worldly practices unfold in a universe of 
relationally defined circumstances. 
  
 
 
 
Social space contains a great diversity of objects, both natural and social, including the 
networks and pathways which facilitate the exchange of material things and information. 
Such ‘objects’ are thus not only things but also relations. As objects, they possess discern- 
ible peculiarities, contour and form. Social labour transforms them, rearranging their 
positions within spatio-temporal configurations. 
(Lefebvre 1991: 77, emphasis added) 
 
Given the relatively arbitrary nature of all social relations, spaces created by human actors are 
always subject to change. 
 
7.       The structurality of social space 
The structural nature of social space is symptomatic of the tangible impact that the territorial 
organization of society has on human actions. ‘Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is 
what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others’ 
(Lefebvre 1991: 73). To borrow a concept from Pierre Bourdieu, every social space is an espace 
des possibles, literally a ‘space of possibles’ (Bourdieu 2000: 151; see also Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 152–53). Social spaces are structurally constituted realms of possibility. 
Human actions take place within the territorial limits imposed upon them by spatial realities. 
Hence, using another Bourdieusian expression, we may describe social space as both a struc- 
tured and a structuring structure (see Bourdieu 2000: 144; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992: 139). As a structured structure, it is structured by human actions; as a structuring struc- 
ture, it structures human actions. Our actions have the power  to  structure the  social spaces we 
inhabit, and the social spaces we inhabit have the power to structure our actions. Human actors 
cannot escape the structuring power of social space, and vice versa. 
 
8.       The visibility of social space 
The visibility of social space is fundamental in that it permeates every sighted subject’s relation 
to the world. ‘Sighted human beings navigate the social world visually’ (Knowles and Sweetman 
2004a: 1). For ‘[s]eeing comes before words . . . [and] establishes our place in the surrounding 
world’ (Mellor and Shilling 1997: 6). In fact, there is a crucial connection between the visuali- 
zation and the organization of space. In our daily lives, social spaces are often seen but unno- 
ticed. The spatial appears natural to its inhabitants when it imposes its presence on the daily 
routines of their actions. Human societies are visualized settings of coexistence, capable of 
exploiting the power of the spectacle to assert the omnipresence of the spatial. 
 
A further important aspect of spaces . . . is their increasingly pronounced visual character. 
They are made with the visible in mind: the visibility of people and things, of spaces and 
of whatever is contained by them. The predominance of visualization . . . serves  to 
conceal repetitiveness. People look, and take sight, take seeing, for life itself. 
(Lefebvre 1991: 75, emphasis added; ‘look’ emphasized in original) 
 
When we take sight for life itself, we transform representations of reality into realities of 
representation. The visual power of space consists in its capacity to convert social normativi- 
ties into seen-but-unnoticed objectivities. Social spaces can make human acts appear as if they 
were mere historical facts. What we all see without noticing is what we all agree upon. What we  
all  agree  upon,  however,   is   never   simply   objective   but  always  also  normative.  ‘Visual 
  
 
 
 
practices are regulatory, they demand that certain things are noticed, that other things are 
denied, and that other things are not seen at all’ (Pile and Thrift 1995b: 48, emphasis added). 
The more we are used to being immersed in particular social spaces on a daily basis, the less 
likely we are to notice their existence. 
 
9.       The rationality of social space 
Since human settings serve particular functions with corresponding codes of legitimacy, every 
social space possesses an idiosyncratic rationality. In the Lefebvrian universe, however, ration- 
ality is conceived of not as a metaphysical force inherent in a monological subject or an omni- 
present object, but as a social force embedded in spatially constituted contexts. From this 
perspective, different modes of rationality emanate from spatially structured realms of sociality. 
 
The rationality of space . . . is not the outcome of a quality or property of human action in 
general, or human labour as such, of ‘man’,  or of social organization. On the contrary, it  
is itself the origin and source . . . of the rationality of activity. 
(Lefebvre 1991: 71–2, emphasis added) 
 
In other words, all forms of human agency are shaped by underlying rationalities inscribed in 
spatially constituted realities. Within the Lefebvrian architecture of society, then, space obtains 
a foundational status: the rationality that motivates a specific human activity cannot be 
dissociated from the spatial determinacy of the social reality that defines its own conditions of 
possibility. The rationality of a particular social space can differ substantially from the ration- 
ality of another social space. The more complex a given society, the more spatially differenti- 
ated forms of rationality it tends to generate. Different social spaces are sustained by diverging 
modes of rationality with idiosyncratic sources of legitimacy. The legitimacy of a performative 
act depends on its acceptability in relation to a social context. In brief, social spaces have the 
power to impose their self-referential rationality on the development of human agency. 
 
10.       The universality of social space 
The universality of social space is based on its ubiquity in the human world. In fact, every 
human action is – directly or indirectly – constrained by the presence of social space. 
 
(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: 
rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their co- 
existence and simultaneity – their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder 
(Lefebvre 1991: 73, emphasis added) 
 
Thus, according to Lefebvre, we need to recognize the foundational status of social space. 
All human relations in all societies at all times are situated in collectively constructed forms of 
space. We cannot possibly relate to the world without contributing to the production of space. 
For ‘any activity developed over (historical) time engenders (produces) a space, and can only 
attain practical “reality” or concrete existence within that space’ (Lefebvre 1991:  115).  If 
space is literally all over the place, then it is a transcendental condition of human life. As a 
transcendental condition of human existence, space is a conditio sine qua non of actors’ immer- 
sion in the world. Given its ubiquity in the social universe, space constitutes a foundational 
force in the daily construction of human reality. 
  
 
 
 
11. The historicity of social space 
The historicity of social space is due to the temporal contingency that pervades all realms of 
worldly existence. Every social space has a unique history, just as history takes place through 
the construction of social spaces. Since ‘[e]very social space is the outcome of a process’, 
‘every social space has a history’ (Lefebvre 1991: 110). The malleable nature of the social  
manifests itself in the processual nature of the spatial: social spaces are never forever; their 
constitution changes over time. 
 
In the history of space as such . . . the historical and diachronic realms and the generative 
past are forever leaving their inscriptions upon the writing-tablet, so to speak, of space. The 
uncertain traces left by events are not the only marks on (or in) space: society in its 
actuality also deposits its script, the result and product of social activities. 
(1991: 110, emphasis added) 
 
Social spaces have – throughout history – been, and will continue to be, produced and trans- 
formed by human actors. The historical variability of people’s engagement with their physical 
reality is symptomatic of the spatial contingency of human agency. To combine Marx’s 
historical materialism with Lefebvre’s historical spatialism means to uncover the spatio- 
material determinacy of the human condition. Accordingly, Marx’s famous aphorism on the 
historical determinacy of human life can be reformulated as follows: ‘Men make their own 
history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it in spaces chosen by 
themselves, but in spaces directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.’1 The 
history of social spaces permeates the unfolding of human practices. 
 
12. The complexity of social space 
The increasing complexity of social space is a sign of the growing differentiation of late-
modern life forms. In light of this complexity, reductionist accounts of the social in general and 
of the spatial in particular lack explanatory power. 
 
A social space cannot be adequately accounted for either by nature (climate, site) or by   its 
previous history. Nor does the growth of the forces of production give rise in any   direct 
causal fashion to a particular space or a particular time. 
(Lefebvre 1991: 77) 
 
In this sense, Lefebvre’s socio-spatial analysis is opposed to three forms of determinism: (a) 
essentialist determinism, (b) naturalistic determinism and (c) economistic determinism. The 
problem with essentialist determinism is that it does not do justice to the fact that social spaces 
are relationally constructed. Social spaces acquire particular meanings from the relations estab- 
lished between human actors, as well as from the material and symbolic connections between 
social spaces. The problem with naturalistic determinism is that it does not account for the fact 
that social spaces are culturally constructed. Surely, social spaces cannot escape the physical 
constraints of the natural world; it is by working upon, and attributing meaning  to,  the physical 
world, however, that human actors have succeeded in transforming their natural environment 
into an ensemble of social arrangements. As a species, we have learned to challenge the law-
governed objectivity of the natural world by immersing ourselves in, and constantly  
reconstructing,    the    power-laden    normativity    of    the    social    world.       The    problem 
  
 
 
 
with economistic determinism is that it underestimates the fact that social spaces are interactionally 
constructed. The relative autonomy of spatial realities derives from the self-empowering contin- 
gency of human agency, which enables us to challenge the systemic imperatives imposed by 
the economy. Social spaces are unavoidably shaped, but not necessarily determined, by 
economic relations. ‘The hypercomplexity of social space should by now be apparent, 
embracing  as it does individual entities and peculiarities, relatively fixed points, movements, 
and flows and waves – some interpenetrating, others in conflict, and so on’ (Lefebvre 1991: 88, 
emphasis added). In short, the potential complexity of the spatial structuration of the human 
universe illustrates that society is irreducible to a monolithically constituted totality. 
 
13.     The polycentricity of social space 
The polycentricity of social space is indicative of its potential complexity. Reflecting upon    the 
diversified nature of highly differentiated societies, Lefebvre reminds us of the fact that ‘[w]e 
are confronted not by one social space but by many – indeed, by an unlimited multiplicity or 
uncountable set of social spaces which we refer to generically as “social space”’ (1991: 86, 
emphasis added). The polycentric nature of highly differentiated life forms manifests itself in 
the emergence of pluralized social spaces: commercial spaces, political spaces, cultural spaces, 
religious spaces, urban spaces, rural spaces, public spaces, domestic spaces, institutional spaces 
and recreational spaces – to mention only a few. Acknowledging the diversified nature of  
spatial settings in large-scale societies, Lefebvre’s approach precludes any illusions about the 
possible reducibility of the social to one constitutive element. The diversification of social 
spaces in highly differentiated collective life forms does not allow for the reduction of society 
to a monolithically constituted totality. The polycentric distribution of social space is 
symptomatic of the decentred constitution of highly differentiated societies. 
 
14.     The interpenetrability of social space 
One crucial feature of social spaces is their interpenetrability. Social spaces are never 
completely, but only relatively, autonomous, since they necessarily exist in relation to one 
another and can, in principle, always be permeated by one  another.  The  interpenetrative 
nature of social spaces stems from their structural intertwinement. ‘The intertwinement of 
social spaces is also a law. Considered in isolation, such spaces are mere abstractions’ (Lefebvre 
1991: 86, emphasis added). Social spaces do not constitute autopoietic systems that exist and 
function in isolation from one another. Rather than representing  completely  self-sufficient  and 
self-referential micro-universes, social spaces exist in relation to each other. Given that 
‘[s]ocial spaces interpenetrate one another and/or superimpose themselves upon one another’ 
(Lefebvre 1991: 86, emphasis removed), they are always subject to power relations: the pene- 
trability of one social space by another social space depends on the power of the latter to 
impose itself upon the former. 
 
The principle of the interpenetration and superimposition of social spaces has one very helpful 
result, for it means that each fragment of space subjected to analysis masks not just one 
social relationship but a host of them that analysis can potentially disclose. 
(Lefebvre 1991: 88, emphasis added) 
 
In other words, the interpenetrability of social spaces cannot be divorced from the polycen- 
tricity of social relations. 
  
 
 
 
15.    The separability of social space 
What manifests itself in the separability of social space is the differentiability of human 
coexistence. Even the most rudimentarily developed form of society cannot dispense with a 
minimal degree of structural differentiation. Yet, the separation of social spaces is  never 
neutral but always power-laden. Separations between social spaces are always also partitions 
between people: between rooms, flats, houses, buildings, streets, neighbourhoods, cities, 
regions, countries or continents. Social spaces can be both externally and internally divided: 
they can be externally divided in that they can be separated from one another, and they can be 
internally divided in that the actors situated in them can be separated from one another. Spatial 
separations necessarily result in normative divisions, for territorial fragmentations inevitably 
structure the constitution of social interactions. 
 
The dominant tendency fragments space and cuts it up into pieces. It enumerates the things, 
the various objects, that space contains. Specializations divide space among them and act 
upon its truncated parts, setting up mental barriers and practico-social frontiers. 
(Lefebvre 1991: 89, emphasis added) 
 
Spatial separations have a tangible impact on how people relate to one another and in fact  
on how they relate to themselves: there are no spatial separations without social mechanisms  of 
inclusion and exclusion. Who we are depends on how we are spatially situated in relation to 
other social actors. The construction of every human identity is contingent upon its spatial 
determinacy. In order to make sense of reality, we need to be placed in society. How we make 
sense of the world is influenced by how and where we are situated in space. The more a given 
society is marked by spatial fragmentations, the more likely it is to produce social separations. 
‘The ideologically dominant tendency divides space up into parts and parcels in accordance with 
the social division of labour’ (Lefebvre 1991: 89–90, emphasis added; ‘ideologically’ 
emphasized in original). 
The control over the partitioning of social space involves the exercise of authority over the 
partitioning of people. The spatial partitioning of society is epitomized in the separation 
between centre and periphery, which can be regarded as a form of real sham: it is sham because 
the criteria for the definition of both the former and the latter are part of an ideological 
imaginary and, therefore, always relatively arbitrary; it is real because it leads to the relative 
empowerment of the spatial core, and the relative disempowerment of the spatial margins, of 
society. People’s social status is reflected in their spatial position: our status as members of a 
given community cannot be divorced from our relationally contingent  location  in  social space. 
Separations between social spaces can trigger, or reinforce, the existence of divisions between 
people. 
 
16.   The commodifiability of social space 
The commodifiable nature of social space is a paradoxical affair. On the one hand, it is an 
intrinsic property of social space that it can be commodified. On the other hand, it is a rela- 
tively arbitrary matter, depending on the economic organization of a particular life form, if 
social space is commodified. There is nothing natural or inevitable about the commodification 
of social space; on the contrary, social space tends to be commodified primarily in market-
driven societies. Nevertheless, even in capitalist systems some spaces – for example, public 
spaces – are protected from commodification, in order to avoid them being absorbed by the 
functional  imperatives  of  the  market  economy.  Yet,  the  fact  that  particular  social  spaces 
  
 
 
 
are deliberately excluded from the commodifying logic of the market confirms the view that,  
in principle, all social spaces can be commodified. To ‘fetishize space in a way reminiscent of 
the old fetishism of commodities, where the trap lay in exchange’ (Lefebvre 1991: 90), means 
to measure the social worth of space primarily in terms of its market value, rather than in  
terms of its use value. 
 
Social space per se is at once work and product – a materialization of “social being”. In 
specific sets of circumstances, however, it may take on fetishized and autonomous char- 
acteristics of things (of commodities and money). 
(1991: 101–2, original emphasis) 
 
Given the ubiquity of exchange value under capitalism, it is easy to forget that the 
commodification of space, far from constituting an inevitable social process, is  contingent 
upon the hegemonic existence of market-driven imperatives. 
 
17.   The controllability of social space 
Struggles over the control of social space illustrate that the territorial organization of society  is 
impregnated with individual and collective interests. One central concern of human life has 
always been, and will always remain, the control of social space. Both as members of partic- 
ular communities and as members of different societies, humans are obliged to organize the 
space they inhabit in one way or another. The right to spatial control can be  at  stake  on 
various levels: individuals’ control over their private sphere, society’s control over its public 
sphere, landowners’ control over their property, or a nation-state’s control over its territory 
– to mention only a few examples. When given the right to be in control of a given space,  
actors tend to take territorial integrity for granted. By contrast, when being deprived of the right 
to be in control of a given space, actors are forced to reflect upon the normative status     of 
territorial realities. ‘The forces of production and technology now permit of intervention at 
every level of space: local, regional, national, worldwide. Space as a whole, geographical or 
historical space, is thus modified, but without any concomitant abolition of its underpinnings’ 
(Lefebvre 1991: 90, emphasis added). In brief, the exercise of power over social arrangements 
is unthinkable without the control over their spatial organization. 
 
18.      The usability of social space 
Social spaces are used for different purposes. Indeed, as human beings, we must make use of 
space. We are obliged to make use of space because we are compelled to live in space. What 
may, at first sight, appear to be a truism is, actually, of crucial importance: we need to  confront 
the implications of the fact that relationally constructed realms serve socially specific 
functions. That social spaces can, or need to, be used is relatively uncontroversial; how they 
should be used, however, could hardly be more controversial. In most cases, the function of 
social space is determined by those who control it. For this reason, Lefebvre insists that 
 
[t]he arrogant verticality of skyscrapers, and especially of public and state buildings, 
introduces a phallic or more precisely a phallocratic element into the visual realm; the 
purpose of this display, of this need to impress, is to convey an impression of authority to 
each spectator. 
(1991: 98, emphasis added) 
  
 
 
 
Space is used not only for the imposition but also for the representation of power. In fact, it      
is through the spatial representation of power that both the symbolic imposition and the 
material imposition of social control become possible. Power needs to have a place in society in 
order  to  have  an  impact  upon  reality.   The  more  we  are  forced  to  accept  the  
organization  of the spaces we inhabit, the more we are deprived from exercising autonomy  
over  our physical immersion in the world. The more we are permitted to contribute to the 
organization of the spaces in which we find ourselves situated, the more we are involved in 
self-determining the ways in which we participate in, and engage with, reality. Disengagement 
generates indifference, whereas engagement induces responsibility. If we leave it to ‘specialists 
who view social space through the optic of their methodology and their reductionistic  
schemata’ (Lefebvre 1991: 108) to decide over the territorial organization of society, we miss 
out on the opportunity to create empowering collective realms shaped by deliberative  
processes and the assertion of human sovereignty. 
 
19.  The contestability of social space 
By definition, the organization of social spaces can be contested, because how and by whom 
realms of action and interaction are used and controlled is always relatively arbitrary. What  
may appear to be an ‘is’ when considering the constitution of a given social space  is at the 
same time an ‘ought to be’. When we are subject to the condition of a spatial setting, we experi- 
ence the apparent naturalness of its presence. By contrast, when we are engaged in the construc- 
tion of a spatial setting, we contribute to the genuine arbitrariness of its existence. Surely, what 
can be socially constructed can be socially reconstructed, and what can be socially recon- 
structed can be individually or collectively fought over. ‘Space as locus of production, as itself 
product and production, is both the weapon and the sign of this struggle’ (Lefebvre 1991: 109, 
emphasis added). From a Marxian perspective, ‘[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is 
the history of class struggles’ (Marx and Engels 1985 [1848]: 79); from a Lefebvrian point of 
view, the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of spatial struggles. 
 
20.       The transformability of social space 
The fact that social spaces can, in principle, always be transformed reflects the malleable nature 
of human existence. Social spaces are in a continuous state of flux, that is, they change over 
time in terms of their structure, their composition and their inhabitants. In the Marxian world, 
everybody should have a right to purposeful work; in the Kantian cosmos, everybody should 
have a right to make use of critical reason; in the Habermasian picture, everybody should have 
a right to a communicatively structured lifeworld; in the Lefebvrian universe, everybody should 
have a right to space. Despite the quasi-ubiquity of commodity fetishism under capitalism, the 
consolidation of non-commodified social spaces is both achievable and desirable: it is 
achievable because the commodification of space is reversible, and it is desirable because the 
commodification of space  is  detrimental.  In  capitalist  society,  social  spaces  are 
bureaucratically controlled by a means-oriented polity and financially driven by a profit-
oriented economy. In an emancipatory society, on the other hand, social spaces are 
democratically managed by grassroots-based communities and deliberatively regulated in 
accordance with the demands of a needs-based economy. 
 
If the production of space does indeed correspond to a leap forward in the productive 
forces . . .,  and  if  therefore  this  tendency . . . must  eventually give rise to a new mode of 
  
 
 
 
production which is neither state capitalism nor state socialism, but the collective manage- 
ment of space, the social management of nature, and the transcendence of the contradic- 
tion between nature and anti-nature, then clearly we cannot rely solely on the application 
of the ‘classical’ categories of Marxist thought. 
(Lefebvre 1991: 102–3, original emphasis) 
 
From this perspective, the social struggles that determine the course of history have to be 
conceived of as spatially constituted conflicts. The formation of autonomous lives depends not 
only on the creation of purposeful activity (Marx), critical minds (Kant) or communicative 
lifeworlds (Habermas), but also on the construction of autonomous spaces (Lefebvre). As 
subjects capable of immersion, we live in social spaces; as subjects capable of transformation, 
we can change them. 
 
Main criticisms and limitations 
The production of space plays a pivotal role in the construction of social reality. Thus, a 
comprehensive theory of the social must confront the challenge of providing a critical account 
of the spatial. Drawing upon the work of Henri Lefebvre, the foregoing analysis has proposed 
an outline of a general theory of social space, that is, of a conceptual framework that permits   
us to identify the key elements that determine every ordinary subject’s spatial immersion in  the 
world. Such an outline is aimed at developing the conceptual tools necessary to understand the 
very possibility of society in terms of its spatial determinacy. Whilst the preceding analysis has 
sought to identify various – arguably transcendental – features of social space, it also raises a 
number of serious questions about the explanatory limitations of Lefebvre’s approach. It is the 
task of this section to reflect upon these limitations, before considering recent and possible 
future developments in the sociology of space in the final part of this chapter. 
 
1. Social spaces are human realms. As such, they are permeated by both the objectivity of the 
natural world and the normativity of the cultural world. Yet, it is far from clear to what 
extent the critical study of space obliges us to abandon the very distinction between ‘the 
natural’ and ‘the cultural’. To the extent that human lifeworlds are both physically consti- 
tuted and symbolically structured, the confluence of the givenness and the meaning-
ladenness of social space escapes the binary logic of a functional dichotomy between 
objectivity and normativity. 
2. Social spaces are collective realms. The idiosyncrasy of a culturally created space cannot be 
divorced from the sociality generated by its inhabitants. Nonetheless, while it is important 
to recognize the collective constitution of social spaces, we must not lose sight of   their 
potentially individualizing function. Human subjects have the ability to develop a sense of 
autonomy and identity within real and imagined spheres of spatiality. 
3. Social spaces are constructed realms. Human beings constantly act upon, and attribute 
meaning to, their physical and cultural environment. Yet, although it is crucial to remind 
ourselves of the constructedness of social arrangements, we must be careful not to over- 
look the constraining power of the ‘hard’ dimensions of spatial realities: the lawfulness of 
physical, geological and biological factors is irreducible to the arbitrariness of historical 
accidents. 
4. Social spaces are productive realms. Different economies generate different forms of spati- 
ality, for the division of labour constitutes the material infrastructure of social reality. 
Arguably, however, the dynamic development of technology  has created a global network 
  
 
 
 
society, whose advanced production, information and transportation systems transcend 
local, regional and national boundaries. 
5. Social spaces are ideological realms. Every regulatory authority requires a symbolically 
constituted representation of spatiality. This insight, though, does not permit  us  to  explain 
the relative autonomy of the discursive frameworks that emerge in particular spatial 
realities. While language games arise within spatially constituted life forms, the creative 
playfulness of the former can challenge the constraining influence of the latter. 
6. Social spaces are relational realms. Just as people can determine relations between spaces, 
spaces can determine relations between people. Relational accounts of space derive their 
explanatory power from their epistemic capacity to capture the interconnectedness 
underlying different modes of agency. They tell us remarkably little, however, about the 
extent to which the ontological specificities of subjects and objects can rise above the 
spatiotemporal contingency of relationally constituted realities. 
7. Social spaces are structural realms. As structured structures, they are brought into exist- 
ence by human actions; as structuring structures, they shape the nature of human actions. 
Yet, regimes of space are always impregnated with regimes of time: every spatial interaction 
takes place in a culturally codified syntax of temporal organization. Immersion in time is 
by no means a less significant precondition for the emergence of social structures than  
immersion in space. 
8. Social spaces are, at least potentially, visible realms. Often spaces are seen without being 
noticed, for visual perception does not always trigger critical reflection. Even when both 
seen and noticed, however, spaces have an underlying and imperceptible physical constitu- 
tion, which may be studied scientifically, but which escapes our commonsense grasp of 
reality. 
9. Social spaces are idiosyncratic realms. In this sense, not only are they sustained by distinc- 
tive forms of rationality with self-referential codes of legitimacy, but they also serve as 
vehicles for the situational contingency of human agency. Yet, foundational forms of 
rationality – notably purposive and substantive rationality – are not necessarily deter- 
mined by the prevalence of a given spatial rationality, because cognitive modes of motiva- 
tion are irreducible to the logic of a specific location. Put differently, rationality is a privilege 
of human beings, rather than of their environment. 
10. Social spaces are ubiquitous realms. Given that space is all over the place, we have to accept 
that physical situatedness is a precondition for our engagement with reality. In the digital 
age, however, the construction of cyberspace allows for the experience of hyperreality,  
which transcends traditional notions of bodily determinacy. 
11. Social spaces are historical realms. Social actors make their own history, but they do so in 
spaces directly experienced, shaped by and passed on from the past. There is no such thing 
as an ahistorical social action taking place in a timeless space. Yet, the explanatory chal- 
lenge consists in identifying the specific conditions that make some spaces relatively stable 
and durable, and others comparatively malleable and transposable. 
12. Social spaces are potentially complex realms. Instead of reducing society to a monolithi- 
cally constituted totality, we need to face up to its spatially constituted complexity. It may 
be fairly straightforward to illustrate that social spaces are composed of multi-layered and 
interwoven elements; it is rather difficult, however, to shed light on the main constituents 
that account for the specificity of a particular type of spatiality. 
13. Social spaces are polycentric realms. Yet, an important question that poses itself – not only to 
Luhmannian systems theorists and Bourdieusian field theorists, but also to Lefebvrian space 
theorists  –  can  be  phrased  as  follows: given  that,  particularly  in  highly  differentiated 
  
 
 
 
societies, various interactional realities overlap, what criterion or criteria should we use to 
define the boundaries of a spatial setting? More specifically, does the preponderance of a 
particular spatial realm depend primarily on objective factors (e.g. structural circumstances), 
intersubjective factors (e.g. relational arrangements), subjective factors (e.g. cognitive projec- 
tions), or a combination of these elements? Critical sociologists have a major task on their 
hands when seeking to provide evidence-based parameters for a non-reductive analysis of 
space. 
14. Social spaces are interpenetrable realms. The relational realms shaped by human subjectivi- 
ties permeate one another as spatial objectivities. The analytical challenge, however, 
consists in exploring not only the penetrability of, but also the hierarchy between, different 
spatial realities in the formation of society. 
15. Social spaces are separable, and hence potentially divisive, realms. Divisions between 
social spaces reflect partitions between people: our spatial position cannot be dissociated 
from our social position, for we need to have a locus in space in order to occupy a place    
in society. Yet, if we admit that spaces can be separated both physically and symbolically 
through the construction of objective and interpretive boundaries, we need to problema- 
tize the potential discrepancy between really existing demarcations and phenomenologically 
projected classifications: although ‘spaces-in-themselves’ and ‘spaces-for-themselves’ – 
that is, ‘realities of space’ and ‘conceptions of space’ – are intimately intertwined, they do 
not necessarily coincide. 
16. Social spaces are commodifiable realms. In capitalist markets, the exchange value of social 
space tends to be predominant over its use value. Nevertheless,  even  in commodified 
social realities there is room for meaningful activities. The presence of an instrumental 
teleology does not necessarily prevent social actors from mobilizing the self-empowering 
resources inherent in substantive rationality. 
17. Social spaces are, at least potentially, controllable realms. The power over a given social 
formation requires the control over its spatial organization. Yet, even the exogenous 
regulation of people’s space does not guarantee control over their minds. Social actors have 
privileged access to their subjectivity regardless of their spatial environment. 
18. Social spaces are usable realms. People need to be able to make use of space, in order to 
engage with and act upon the world. The philosophically more interesting question, 
however, is to what extent humans either have a moral right to use spaces as means to an 
end or have a moral obligation to treat spaces as ends in themselves. The tension between 
the instrumental nature of Verstand and the value-laden constitution of Vernunft comes to 
the fore when grappling with the ethical implications of our relation to space. 
19. Social spaces are contestable realms. Legitimate actors are nothing without legitimate 
spaces, just as legitimate spaces are nothing without legitimate actors. The struggle over 
the right to space is a struggle over the right to live. It is far from clear, however, on what 
normative grounds it is possible to distinguish between universally defensible and tribalisti- 
cally motivated reasons for the right to space. An emancipatory politics must resist the 
temptation to endorse primordial and exclusionary conceptions of Lebensraum. 
20. Social spaces are potentially transformable realms. A critical sociology of space allows us to 
put our capacity to reconstruct reality at centre stage. As immersive entities,  we  are 
thrown into social spaces; as transformative entities, we can change them. Social strug- 
gles, in addition to shaping the course of history, have a place in space. This does not mean, 
however, that every social struggle is reducible to a struggle for and over space. 
  
 
 
 
Recent and possible future developments 
Having reflected upon some of the key limitations and questions arising from Lefebvre’s 
approach, let us, in the final part of this chapter, consider recent and possible future develop- 
ments in social and cultural theories of space. Given that, unavoidably, such an analysis is 
selective and limited in scope, this closing section does not aim to do justice to the range and 
complexity of the various explanatory frameworks that have been developed over the past few 
decades in the sociology of space. Rather, it will focus on a few central issues relevant to 
contemporary studies of space. 
 
a) John Urry is widely recognized as one of the major social theorists of global flows, ‘mobilities’ 
and migration. Perhaps the most fundamental thesis underlying his writings on space (see, 
for instance, Elliott and Urry 2010; Gregory and Urry 1985; Urry 1985, 1995, 2000, 2007) 
is the following assumption: the traditional notion that ‘[e]ach “society” is a sovereign  
social entity with a nation-state that organises the rights and duties of each societal member 
or citizen’ (Urry 2000: 8) no longer holds true. In other words, whereas in classical soci- 
ology ‘[m]ost major sets of social relationships are seen as flowing within the territorial 
boundaries of the society’ (2000: 8), in the contemporary age ‘shifts towards global 
networks and flows’ transcend the narrow logic and ‘boundaries of the nation-state’ (2000: 
198). Given the increasing interconnectedness of the contemporary world, we need to 
account for the material and symbolic complexity of the global network society, whose 
transnational character obliges us to revise the conceptual and methodological tools of 
classical sociology. 
b) Manuel Castells, one of the most celebrated contemporary social theorists, is perhaps best 
known for coining the idea that in the late twentieth century the world witnessed the rise   of 
the network society. It comes as no surprise, then, that ‘space’ is a key category in his major 
works (see, for example, Castells 1977, 1989, 2001). In his acclaimed trilogy The Information 
Age (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998), he offers a remarkably detailed account of the sociological 
issues arising from the emergence of informational and communicational networks across 
the world. According to Castells, the consolidation of the network society is the result        
of three interconnected processes: (i) the rapid development of information technologies; 
(ii) the profound restructuring of welfare regimes and the collapse of state socialism; and 
(iii) the emergence and growing influence of new social movements. To the extent that 
technological, economic and political ‘[n]etworks constitute the new social morphology     
of our societies’ (Castells 1996: 500), we live in an age in which the interplay between 
locality and globality is crucial to the historical development of humanity. 
c) Anthony Giddens, arguably one of the most influential and prolific social theorists of the 
late twentieth century (see, for instance, Giddens 1984, 1991, 2000), maintains that an 
essential feature of modernity is the uncoupling of space and time. Giddens’s view that this 
‘time-space distanciation’ (see esp. Giddens 1990) is central to social modernization proc- 
esses is based on the following assumption: ‘[i]n pre-modern societies, space and place 
largely coincide’ (1990: 18), as people’s engagement with reality is limited to their imme- 
diate experience of geographically constricted lifeworlds; by contrast, ‘[t]he advent of 
modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between “absent” 
others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction’ (1990: 18). 
Put differently, the perpetual reproduction of the pre-modern world is founded on the 
experience of social, cultural and territorial embeddedness, whereas under the condition    of 
modernity ‘space’ has escaped the confining shackles of ‘place’. 
  
 
 
 
d) Ulrich Beck is probably best known for his numerous writings on the thesis that the rise    
of a ‘second’ or ‘reflexive’ modernity manifests itself in the emergence of a ‘global risk 
society’ (see, for example, Beck 1992, 1999, 2009). By definition, global risks transcend 
geographical and demographical boundaries. More importantly, however, global risks 
require global solutions. In order to overcome the ‘methodological nationalism’ of classical 
sociology, we need to understand the various paradigmatic shifts that are indicative of the 
transition from ‘first modernity’ to ‘second modernity’: (i) Critical reflexivity: Social actors 
have become increasingly critical of traditional norms, institutions and belief systems, 
whose legitimacy is constantly at stake in public debates guided by the search for rational 
and empirical evidence. (ii) Complex identities: Social actors are not only allowed but also 
expected to construct multifaceted personal identities, as they enjoy an unprecedented 
degree of individual freedom. (iii) Ontological continuum: The condition of ‘reflexive 
modernity’ is characterized by the gradual erosion of traditional dichotomies, such as 
culture versus nature, life versus death, citizen versus foreigner, micro versus macro, local 
versus global, and place versus space. (iv) Time-space compression: Due to the rapid develop- 
ment of globalized production, information and transportation systems, physical proximity 
is no longer a precondition for social propinquity. (v) Cosmopolitanism: In light of the 
increasing influence of non-governmental actors ‘from below’ and supranational actors 
‘from above’, the nation-state fails to serve as a viable normative reference point for dealing 
with the profound political, economic and environmental challenges faced by the global  
risk society. From this perspective, cosmopolitanism is not only a realistic utopia but also   a 
practical necessity. Social actors have always lived in a global space, but, in the era of 
‘second modernity’, cosmopolitan forms of reflexivity have become a precondition for the 
long-term survival of humanity. 
e) In his abundant writings (see, for instance, Soja 1989, 1996, 2000), Edward Soja aims to 
demonstrate that ‘space’ deserves to be treated as a practical foundation of human life as 
well as a theoretical cornerstone of social and cultural analysis. Drawing on central insights 
from poststructuralist and postmodernist thought, he insists upon the normalizing function 
of spatial arrangements. To the extent that ‘relations of power and discipline are inscribed 
into the apparently innocent spatiality of social life . . . human geographies become filled 
with politics and ideology’ (Soja 1989: 6). More specifically, Soja seeks to illustrate the 
validity of three fundamental assumptions. (i) Under the condition of late modernity, 
capitalism has been restructured in such a way that ‘the spatial’ is both materially and 
symbolically preponderant over ‘the temporal’. (ii) ‘Space’ constitutes a central component 
of social life. (iii) Given its pivotal role in processes of social reproduction and transforma- 
tion, the concept of ‘space’ needs to be given analytical priority in critical theory. Soja’s 
‘triple dialectic of space, time and social being’ (1989: 12), then, is aimed not only at the 
(re-) spatialization of critical theory, but also at the deconstruction of the problematic 
opposition between space (often misrepresented as a fixed, stable and immobile state of 
being) and time (commonly conceived of as a dynamic, fluid and volatile mode of 
becoming). His insistence upon the ontological interdependence of spatiality, historicity and 
sociality is inspired, at once, by the defence of a critical human geography, by the post- 
modern incredulity towards determinist accounts of history, and by the Marxist-Weberian 
suspicion towards instrumental rationality. Arguably, this trialectics of being lies at the heart 
of any society, regardless of its typological specificity. 
f) Doreen Massey is commonly regarded as one of the most prominent contemporary British 
geographers. In her various writings (see, for example, Massey 1994, 1995, 2005), she aims 
to demonstrate that space is a product of interrelations (relationality), a physical realm 
  
 
 
 
composed of heterogeneous parts (multiplicity) and an open reality constantly under 
construction (malleability). The first assumption is motivated by the conviction that spaces 
are shaped primarily by the relations and interactions between subjects and objects, rather 
than by their alleged properties. The second claim is based on the view that, particularly   in 
highly differentiated settings, spaces are constructed by multiple and heterogeneous subjects 
and objects, whose diversified identities are indicative of the complexity of polycentric 
societies. The third presupposition suggests that spaces are malleable and dynamic modes of 
being, that is, they are in a constant state of flux, even when this is not immediately obvious. 
While insisting on the relational, multifaceted and malleable nature of social space, 
Massey’s empirical studies shed light on the manifold ways in which social spaces are 
differentiated in terms of sociological variables, notably class, ethnicity and gender. Her 
substantive investigations have five major theoretical implications. (i) Just as there is  no 
space without place, there is no place without space. (ii) Space is situated in time, while time 
is located in space. (iii) To the extent that space is shaped by and through society, society is 
constructed by and through space. (iv) The construction of space is imbued with meaning, 
and the creation of meaning takes place in space. (v) Spatial power is a form of social 
power, at the same time as social power is a form of spatial power. It is the task of a 
radically anti-essentialist politics to challenge hegemonic practices and beliefs, thereby 
reminding us of the fact that ‘[i]t is not spatial form in itself (nor distance, nor movement) 
that has effects, but the spatial form of particular and specified social processes and social 
relationships’ (Massey 1984: 5, emphasis added). 
g) In her plentiful writings (see, for instance, Sassen 2001, 2007, 2008), Saskia Sassen aims to 
demonstrate that, contrary to common wisdom, ‘place’ plays a crucial role in the construc- 
tion of an increasingly interconnected global society. This, she claims, is illustrated in the 
managerial and economic power exercised by professional elites in metropolises such as 
London, New York and Tokyo. Their existence indicates that we are confronted with a 
curious paradox: on the one hand, we live in a world of increasing mobility, volatility and 
dispersal of both capital and labour; on the other hand, the contemporary age is character- 
ized by the concentration of power, resources and wealth in metropolitan  centres  with 
global influence. In other words, the dynamic interplay between space and place is 
fundamental to globalization processes. To be exact, the simultaneous globalization and 
localization of social reality is reflected in five key tendencies: economic transnationalization 
(geographical scattering of commercial activities), economic specialization (outsourcing of 
productive, distributive and administrative services), economic concentration (agglomeration 
of financial power in urban areas and metropolises), economic tertiarization (concentration of 
a highly specialized service sector in global cities) and economic urbanization (hierarchization 
of global cities in terms of their influence on the worldwide network of knowledge, 
information and services). As these tendencies unambiguously show, ‘place’ is vital to the 
global organization of space. 
h) Inspired by Lefebvre’s approach, one of the key aims of David Harvey’s work is to give the 
concept of ‘space’ a central place in Marxist social theory (see, for example, Harvey 1989, 
2000, 2001, 2006). Far from conceiving of space as a natural given, Harvey regards spatial 
arrangements as both a cause and an effect of social practices. In the context of modernity, 
social spatiality is permeated by the systemic logic of the capitalist economy. Harvey insists 
that, by definition, the spatial organization of human environments contains both an  
objective and a subjective dimension. In fact, all human societies are composed of both 
(material) ‘spaces-in-themselves’ and (symbolic) ‘spaces-for-themselves’. At the objective 
level,   the most idiosyncratic places can be absorbed by the standardizing logic of capitalist 
  
 
 
 
productivism and consumerism. At the subjective level, the most homogenized spatial 
arrangements are perceived and experienced differently by interpretive actors with unique 
life stories. It is one of Harvey’s major achievements to have demonstrated that, just as the 
dialectical construction of human reality is inconceivable without the production of space, 
the existence of hegemonic systems of domination manifests itself in instrumental modes  
of geographical organization.  Thus, even the ‘condition of postmodernity’ (Harvey 1989) 
– commonly associated with unprecedented degrees of complexity, multiplicity  and  
fluidity – constitutes an era characterized by the enduring existence of systematicity, 
determinacy and instrumental rationality. 
i) Given the eclectic nature and large scope of his intellectual work, it is difficult to do justice 
to the depth and breadth of Nigel Thrift’s analysis of space (see, for instance, Leyshon and 
Thrift 1997; Peet and Thrift 1989; Pile and Thrift 1995a; Thrift 1996). One may suggest, 
however, that his ‘new regional geography’ is based on six central assumptions. 
(i) Contingency: Space is socially constructed, both as a material sphere, acted and worked 
upon by purposive entities, and as a symbolic realm, imagined and experienced by interpre- 
tive creatures. (ii) Temporality: Space is situated in time, just as time is located in space. 
Spatial arrangements are imbued with historicity. (iii) Agency: Far from representing simply 
a social fact, space constitutes also a social act. The performativity inherent in social reality 
permeates spatiality with meaning-laden horizons of human agency. (iv) Intersubjectivity: 
Even in a globalized environment, in which ‘space’ appears to be preponderant over ‘place’, 
interpersonal relations, established in communicatively structured lifeworlds, continue to   
be vital to the functional reproduction of the social fabric. The most abstract forms of social 
relations, mediated by money and bureaucratic administration, cannot dispense  with  
mutual understanding, trust and cooperation. (v) Contextuality: Notwithstanding the degree 
of planetary interconnectedness, critical geographers need to be sensitive to local and 
regional specificities. In fact, globalization is as much about systemic standardization as it is 
about social differentiation. (vi) Discursivity: Just as different spaces create different 
discourses, different discourses generate different spaces. It is because humans are immersed 
in space that they play language games in historically specific life forms. 
 
Conclusion 
As should be evident from the previous analysis, ‘space’ – both as a symbolic imaginary and  
as an empirical reality, as a conceptual tool of critical enquiry and as a constitutive element of 
society – deserves to be taken seriously by social and cultural theorists. This is essentially due 
to the fact that all domains of human existence are, directly or indirectly, affected by the 
production, and constant reinvention, of space. Hence, in order to uncover the social deter- 
minacy of the spatial, we need to grasp the spatial determinacy of the social, and vice versa. 
As elucidated in the first section of this chapter, it is worth remembering that, although 
space can be regarded as a marginal category in classical sociology, Simmel’s work provides 
useful insights into the spatial constitution of everyday life. To be exact,  his writings shed light 
on the fact that the social construction of spatial realities is permeated by five power-laden 
tensions: inclusivity versus exclusivity, unifiability versus separability, fixity versus 
changeability, proximity versus distance, and sedentariness versus mobility. 
As demonstrated in the second section of this chapter, Lefebvre’s writings are based on the 
assumption that the construction of society is inconceivable without the production of space.   
As a species, we have learned to shape not only the cultural and economic arrangements of 
social life, but also the spatial circumstances of our existence.  Thus, in order to comprehend 
  
 
 
 
how we are embedded in society, we need to understand how we are situated in spatial forms of 
reality. To this end, the foregoing study has proposed a Lefebvrian outline of a general theory 
of social space, that is, an analytical framework capable of identifying the transcendental 
conditions underlying the spatial structuration of any society, regardless of its historical 
specificity. As emphasized in the third section of this chapter, however, it is vital to be aware of 
the explanatory limitations of Lefebvre’s approach, in order to avoid painting a simplistic 
picture of the spatial organization of human societies. 
Finally, as shown in the fourth section of this chapter, there have been considerable devel- 
opments in recent sociological studies of space. The above overview, which  captures only 
some of these paradigmatic trends, is unavoidably selective and limited in scope. No attempt 
has been made here to give an exhaustive account capable of doing justice to the variety and 
intricacy of the explanatory frameworks that have emerged over the past few decades in the 
sociology of space. Nonetheless, the preceding synopsis has illustrated that several social and 
cultural theorists – as diverse as Urry, Castells, Giddens, Beck, Soja, Massey, Sassen, Harvey 
and Thrift – share one central conviction: human actors, given that they are bodily entities,  
will always have a place in space. 
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Notes 
1  Cf. Marx (2000 [1845]: 329): ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they      
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.’ 
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